The death of Pericles was a significant event in the course of the Peloponnesian War; however, even without Pericles’ leadership the Athenian Assembly had countless opportunities to prevent their loss and chose not to take them. The fickleness and inefficiency of democracy (‘the mob’) allowed the Athenians to be easily influenced and therefore electing populists such as Cleon, Lysicles and Hyperbolus into dominant leadership roles. Election, via democratic means, of such populists, meant that the Athenians would take a much more aggressive approach to the war and therefore abandon the policies that Pericles had previously established. So in turn, democracy the institution for which the Athenians fought tirelessly to protect, rather than the death of Pericles, ironically became the dominant factor influencing the final outcome of this Ancient Greek civil war.

As can be expected from pioneer governmental institutions, Athenian democracy was not perfect. In fact it was far from it. It resulted in the establishment of poor policies by aggressive populists who sought “…private ambition and private profit…which were bad both for the Athenians themselves and their allies.” (Thucydides). These self interested populist leaders with personal gain in mind established extensive internal political instability “…by quarrelling among themselves [and] began to bring confusion into the policy of the state.” (Thucydides). Repeated opportunities to accept terms of peace after the battles of Pylos (425), Arginusae (406) and Aegospotami (405) were ignored by the inefficient Athenian demos eventually resulting in the devastation of the once dominant city-state. Internal political strife can also be attributed to the presence of Nicias, a conservative aristocrat, who intensely opposed the aggressive policies of the populist leaders. This divergence of opinion meant that the Athenians would struggle greatly to establish continuously successful policies and strategies, and were immediately impeded by this inefficient nature of democracy. Events such as the trial and execution of eight Athenian naval leaders after the Battle of Arginusae, prove the extreme feebleness of Athenian democracy. A needless act of aggression in 416, towards the neutral city-state of Melos inspired immediate reactions from Athenian allies, who were already appearing somewhat disloyal. The Athenians were then forced into conflict “…against their own allies, most of which had revolted.” (Thucydides). This Athenian internal conflict perhaps came to a climax in 411, when an oligarchy of 400 revolted and took over Athens for over 3 months, before a democratic restoration. However, “…in the end it was only because they had destroyed themselves by their own internal strife that finally they were forced to surrender.” (Thucydides). Perhaps one of the worst mistakes by the 5th Century Athenian demagogues was the decision to embark upon a Second Sicilian Expedition, in 415, despite failing the first time and fierce opposition by Nicias and other conservatives.

Undertaken to satisfy the imperialist ambitions of Alcibiades, the nephew of Pericles, the second Sicilian Expedition proved to be one of the worst miscalculation of Athenian history. Failure to achieve an outcome after the First Expedition led to the request for an Athenian departure, by the Sicilian cities. Describing the second invasion as “…a failure on the part of those who were at home to give proper support to their forces overseas.” ,Thucydides details how Athens had devoted too large a force towards the campaign, neglecting their needs for mainland defence. The Assembly entirely disregarded Nicias’ fierce opposition towards the idea, and for some reason continued to elect him one of the three commanders for the expedition, despite his intense disapproval. This displays the poor decision making apparent at the behest of the Athenian Assembly and its feebleness to disregard this significant flaw in their plan. Their extremely limited knowledge of Sicily and its available resources, combined with giving joint leadership to three very different and conflicting leaders, meant that Athens never really stood a plausible chance. The fact that Alcibiades, one of the three commanders, was recalled for committing sacrilegious activities, worsened their predicament, and deprived the Athenian military of the one leader who could have possibly brought success. These factors greatly influenced the outcome of the expedition and even after substantial losses had occurred, the Assembly continued to refuse Nicias’ request for withdrawal. Instead, the Athenians sent major reinforcements to Sicily, and suffered a massive defeat at the hands of the Peloponnesians. This then left Athens exposed and substantially defenceless, remaining in this somewhat unfavourable position for sometime. The role of Alcibiades throughout the expedition, and the remainder of the war, was extremely important, if not vital to the final outcome of the conflict, proving to be a determining factor of the Athenians’ fate.

Brought up from a similar background to that of his uncle, Alcibiades was an extremely ambitious and inconsistent leader, becoming a dominant factor in the downfall of Athens. His ambitious and self-interested nature is truly displayed by the statement that “Oligarchy and democracy were all one to Alcibiades…and what he was really after was to…come back to Athens” (Ibid). Through “The power of Alcibiades influence…” (Ibid) and “…his desire to hold the command…” (Thucydides), he urged the Athenians to undertake the second Sicilian Expedition, while he was recalled and for opportunistic reasons of self-interest, fled to Sparta. There he sold Athenian secrets to the Spartans and encouraged them to attack Athens, both on the mainland and in Sicily. He fled again to the Persians, before being welcomed back into a war-stricken Athens, because he still “…was the most enterprising and experienced general Athens had produced during the war…”. However, once again democracy proved to be inefficient and fickle, with Athens again losing Alcibiades over a petty issue, in 407. They then refused his advice prior to the Battle of Aegospotami (406) and suffered the concluding defeat of the war.

Had Pericles not died, significant flaws in his policies would have become increasingly evident and the downfall of Athens inevitable. Firstly, Pericles’ confident predictions of victory against the Spartans displayed substantial evidence of arrogance and major underestimation of the power of his enemy. He also underestimated the expense of the war which would have led to enormous unexpected costs, in turn resulting in dependence and aggression towards the Athenian allies for financial input and the revolt and dissolution of the Delian League. Through this necessary aggression for financial resources Pericles would therefore be in opposition of his policies. His denial of the enemy’s capability of establishing a fleet to match that of Athens, possibly suggests that, had Pericles’ survived, his policies would have inevitably failed after the Sparta-Persia alliance. His strategy of moving all Athenians with the walls of Athens exacerbated the effect of the plague and brought upon his own death. The fact that the policies brought upon Pericles’ death, also foreshadows the self-inflicted nature of the Athenians’ downfall, via democratic failure. Finally, his obsessive need to control the democracy of Athens meant that “…if Pericles had lived, he may have actually hindered Athenian attempts to find some way out of the stalemated war.” (http://www.warhorsesim.com/epw_hist.html). Pericles’ death was significant. The Athenians had lost one of their greatest leaders. But even if the policies of Pericles had not been abandoned by the feeble Athenian democracy, the cost of the war would have proved too great and thus Athenian defeat was inevitable.

It was a series of consequential events, spurred on by democratic failure, not one key turning point, that resulted in the decisive defeat of the Athenians by the Peloponnesians, with the aid of Persia. Because of democratic fickleness, with or without Pericles the Athenians were doomed for defeat, and therefore the death of Pericles was not the key turning point, rather it was only a factor which determined the length of the Peloponnesian War.